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Linda Ann Malone

The Legal Dilemma of Guantánamo Detainees
From Bush to Obama
In the heated debate over Attorney General Eric Holder’s announcement
that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed would be tried at a Guantánamo military
commission, Americans, whether in favor or opposed to the decision, seem
to be suffering from collective amnesia as to how this decision came to pass.
Mohammed’s commission proceeding will take place ten years after 9/11 for
two reasons. First, the Bush administration unnecessarily, immorally, and
illegally engaged in torture of the worst perpetrators of terrorist acts, and
the Bush administration repeatedly chose to advance its theory of an allpowerful executive branch at the expense of prosecuting these perpetrators
expeditiously, against the urging of the most experienced and knowledgeable
military legal advisors. That torture was committed, however narrowly and
self-servingly defined, has been acknowledged by President Bush himself;
that the supremacy of the executive power was a top priority over these
prosecutions and other critical areas of national decision-making has been
acknowledged by President Bush and many of his advisors.
The second reason for ten years of delay has only as justification a political
agenda to establish the supremacy of the executive branch over the legislative
and judicial branches. Whatever minimal guidance the Supreme Court
provided in the process required for the detainees in the decisions of Rasul
v. Bush, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumedienne v. Bush, was rejected by the
Bush administration. Each time the administration turned to a cooperative
Congress – not to provide even the minimum deemed necessary to comply
with each decision, but to provide less than what was required by the Court
or to explore another legal argument for not complying. If the administration
after Hamdi in 2004, and certainly after Hamdan in 2006, had declared that
the commissions would utilize the long-established Uniform Code of Military
Justice (again, as the most experienced and knowledgeable military law
experts advocated), justice could have proceeded. Instead, courageous military
and civilian lawyers seeking to compel compliance with each prior phase
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of Supreme Court guidance on constitutional and humanitarian law were
accused of delaying the commissions and justice for the victims.
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. had sufficient
jurisdiction and control over Guantánamo Bay under the federal habeas
statute for habeas to be available to detainees to challenge their detention as a
statutory matter. After Rasul, President Bush, by executive order, established
combatant status review tribunals (CSRTs) to evaluate whether or not a
detainee is an “enemy combatant,” with military commissions to conduct war
crime trials of “unlawful enemy combatants.”
In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held these military
commissions, as established by the executive branch, were invalid as not in
compliance with requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Geneva Conventions. Working with a cooperative Congress, President Bush,
in the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA), re-established the military
commissions with congressional authorization and expanded procedures, but
also stripped the federal courts of habeas review for broadly defined unlawful
enemy combatants (beyond just Guantánamo Bay detainees). The 2006 MCA
sanctioned the use of coerced testimony before the military commissions.
It authorized non-Department of Defense interrogators to use enhanced
interrogation techniques so long as they do not “shock the conscience,” and
it granted immunity for those who have sanctioned or engaged in common
Article 3 “outrages upon personal dignity.”
The “habeas-stripping” provisions of the 2006 MCA reached the Supreme
Court in 2008, in a 5-4 decision with the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy
and dissents from Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts. In
Boumedienne v. Bush, five of the Justices concluded that Congress did not have
the constitutional authority to suspend habeas corpus for detainees, rendering
Section 7 of the 2006 Military Commissions Act unconstitutional because
no suspension was allowed unless “in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it.” Additionally, suspension of habeas was not otherwise
permissible because the Commission Status Review Tribunal procedures were
not an adequate substitute for habeas review.
Dissenting Chief Justice Roberts concluded the majority should not have
even reached the second issue but remanded to the lower court to determine if
the CSRT procedures were an “adequate substitute” for habeas review. Justice
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Scalia, writing for all dissenters, argues that habeas review does not extend to
aliens seized and held outside the U.S.
In this landmark 2008 decision of Boumediene, the Supreme Court thus
held that the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, was subject to
the “full effect” of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution,
and that Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which stripped
federal courts of their jurisdiction to consider Guantánamo detainees’ habeas
petitions, “effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.” Accordingly,
the alien detainees held by the executive branch at Guantánamo after their
capture were entitled to “invoke the fundamental procedural protections of
habeas corpus.” With the extension of federal court jurisdiction of Guantánamo
detainees’ habeas petitions, district courts in the District of Columbia Circuit
began to: (1) vacate their prior dismissals of such habeas petitions that relied
on MCA’s § 7 as required by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene; or
(2) revive detainees’ habeas petitions that were stayed until the decision in
Boumediene was handed down in June 2008.
The decision left many critical questions unresolved. The Supreme Court
did not decide:
1.
2.

3.
4.

The statutory or constitutional validity of the CSRT procedure;
The statutory or constitutional validity of military commissions as set up
under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, or their compliance with
the Geneva Conventions;
What must be demonstrated by the government or the detainee at a
habeas proceeding; or
What procedures are necessary to satisfy the due process requirements for
habeas review.

Yet another military commissions act was signed into law by President
Obama on October 28, 2009. Under this current act:
1.
2.
3.

A military judge presides over commission proceedings;
The President must approve executions;
Appeals are permitted to the Military Commissions Court of Review, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court, and ultimately the Supreme Court;
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There is jurisdiction over 32 crimes, including conspiracy, terrorism, and
material support of terrorism; and
Defendants are guaranteed counsel.

The term alien “illegal enemy combatant” in the 2006 Act changed to
“unprivileged enemy belligerents (UEBs),” which is defined as someone who
either:
1.
2.
3.

Engaged in hostilities against the U.S.;
Purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the U.S.; or
Was a part of Al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense.

Only alien UEBs are subject to a military commission. Hearsay evidence
is still admissible, but it is much more restricted than under the 2006 MCA,
and there is exclusion of statements obtained by torture: “No statement
obtained by the use of torture or by cruel, or inhuman treatment, or degrading
treatment ... shall be admissible in a military commission under this chapter.”
Self-incrimination is also prohibited as no one is required to testify against
himself/herself. More generally, a statement of the accused may be admitted only
if the military judge finds that it is reliable and authentically voluntary. The
accused can present evidence in his/her defense and examine and respond to all
evidence admitted on the issue of guilt or innocence and on sentencing.
Following the decision in Boumediene, the courts in the D.C. Circuit first
outlined a standard to ascertain exactly who could be justifiably detained
at Guantánamo. The post-Boumediene decisions draw primarily on the broad
language of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which
enables the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against
those ... persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2011 ... in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such ...
persons” (Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a)
(2001)). At a minimum, the “all necessary and appropriate force” language of
the AUMF “includes the power to capture and detain those described in the
congressional authorization” (Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004)).
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In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court stated that the category of
persons subject to detention “includes those who are part of forces associated with
Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such forces
in hostilities against U.S. Coalition forces” (Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866,
872 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) (emphasis added). To meet the threshold showing that
a detainee was “part of” Al Qaeda, it is not necessary to show that an individual
“operates within Al Qaeda’s formal command structure,” although such a
showing is sufficient to meet this threshold (Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718,
725 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The
inquiry should instead focus “upon the actions of the individual in relation to
the organization” rather than relying on a determination of whether or not the
detainee “formally received or executed any orders” from Al Qaeda, the Taliban,
or associated forces (Uthman v. Obama, 2011 WL 1120282, *2 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). The D.C. Circuit Court
has opined that the evidence of action must surpass the bare minimum level of
the “purely independent conduct of a freelancer” (Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725).
Furthermore, the evidence must relate to whether the petitioner was a ‘part of’
an associated force at the time of capture, rather than focus entirely on conduct
occurring long before the U.S. military took possession of the detainee (Salahi,
625 F.3d at 750-51). Importantly, in the evaluation of whether a detainee should
be continually held, the court should not inquire into “[w]hether a detainee
would pose a threat to U.S. interests if released” but rather whether the hostilities
themselves are still continuing (Awad, 608 F.3d at 11).
Over a course of successive decisions, the D.C. Circuit courts announced
that the government has the burden of showing in the district court, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner’s continued detention
is lawful, and that such a standard is constitutional (Odah v. United States,
611 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (calling such a standard “now wellsettled law”)). On appeal, D.C. Circuit panels began summarily dismissing
petitioners’ challenges that alleged a standard of reasonable doubt or clear
and convincing evidence was constitutionally required: “[l]est there be any
further misunderstandings, let us be absolutely clear. A preponderance of the
evidence standard satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a habeas
petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF” (Awad v. Obama, 608
F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)). The opinion in Al-Bihani,
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which established the constitutionality of such a preponderance standard for
use in these cases, explicitly stated, however, that the court’s determination
of constitutionality did not include an “endeavor to identify what standard
would represent the minimum required by the Constitution” (Al-Bihani, 590
F.3d at 878 (emphasis added)). The court in Al-Adahi, after briefly reviewing
the history of standards of proof used in habeas petitions, noted that the
rationale for adoption of such preponderance standard by D.C. Circuit courts
following Boumediene is “unstated,” and proffered its doubt as to whether “the
Suspension Clause requires the use of the preponderance standard” (Al-Adahi,
613 F.3d at 1104-05). In Al-Adahi, therefore, the court proceeded with the
case under the assumption, “arguendo[,] that the government must show by
a preponderance of the evidence” that the petitioner’s detention was lawful
because of his association with Al Qaeda (Id. at 1105).
The cases decided in the D.C. Circuit to date have included detailed
analyses of the evidence presented by the government on whether each
petitioner was “part of” Al Qaeda. The evidence is to be considered as a
whole, and not in a piecemeal fashion with individual pieces of evidence
viewed in isolation (Awad, 608 F.3d at 7). In Al-Adahi, the court, in very
strong language, condemned the district court’s “mistaken view that each
item of the government’s evidence” on its own “needed to prove the ultimate
issue in the case” (Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1111). Specifically, each piece of
evidence must be examined in the context of the whole of the government’s
presentation and not cast aside before conducting an evaluation of the next
individual piece of evidence (Salahi, 625 F.3d at 753). A finding that a
petitioner was “part of” Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces signifies
that continued justification is lawful, and will lead to district court denial of
the petitioner’s request for the writ of habeas corpus (Esmail v. Obama, 2011 WL
1327701, *3 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The following non-exhaustive list of factors
have been found, by the district courts and appellate courts on review, to be
factors suggestive of a petitioner’s being a “part of” such forces. These factors
are therefore supportive of an ultimate conclusion that the requisite standard
has been met, when considered along with other listed factors, and all of the
evidence offered by the government in its entirety: admissions of travel to
Afghanistan for purposes of fighting U.S. forces (see, e.g., Awad, 608 F.3d at
10); close connections with Al Qaeda operatives (see, e.g., Salahi, 625 F.3d at
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753; Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1107); the location of capture (see, e.g., Barhoumi
v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2010)), especially significant if in
the vicinity of Tora Bora (see, e.g., Uthman, 2011 WL at *3) or at a known Al
Qaeda guesthouse (see, e.g., Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 427); being captured along
with known Taliban fighters or Al Qaeda operatives (see, e.g., Esmail, 2011
WL at *2; Uthman, 2011 WL at *3; Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1110); providing
arms training to militia members for operations against U.S. forces (see, e.g.,
Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 427); receiving military instruction at a known Al
Qaeda or associated terrorist training camp (see, e.g., id.; Esmail, 2011 WL at
*1; Odah, 611 F.3d at 15-16; Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1109); illogical or false
explanations for presence in Afghanistan or association with Taliban or Al
Qaeda fighters (see, e.g., Esmail, 2011 WL at *2; Uthman, 2011 WL at *5);
attendance at religious schools known as Al Qaeda recruiting grounds (see,
e.g., Uthman, 2011 WL at *4); traveling along known Al Qaeda routes to and
from Afghanistan (see, e.g., id.; Odah, 611 F.3d at 16); presence at Al Qaeda
guesthouses during travels (see, e.g., Uthman, 2011 WL at *5; Al-Adahi, 613
F.3d at 1107-08); lack of passport at capture (see, e.g., Uthman, 2011 WL at
*5); following directions of Al Qaeda or Taliban officials (Odah, 611 F.3d
at 15); and Al Qaeda documentation listing member names including the
detainee’s, when presented in conjunction with corroborative testimony from
other operatives (see, e.g., Awad, 608 F.3d at 8-9).
As for the conduct of the habeas proceedings themselves, the court in
Al-Bihani held that the “[h]abeas review for Guantánamo detainees need
not match the procedures developed by Congress and the courts specifically
for habeas challenges to criminal convictions” (Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 876
(internal quotation symbols omitted)). Basing their decision off the holding
in Boumediene, which “explicitly stated that habeas procedures for detainees
need not resemble a criminal trial,” the Al-Bihani court held that the courts
reviewing habeas petitions are “neither bound by the procedural limits created
for other detention contexts nor obliged to use them as baselines from which
any departures must be justified” (Id. at 876-77). Therefore, the detainees in
Guantánamo habeas proceedings are “not subject to all the protections given
to defendants in criminal prosecutions” (Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1111 n. 6).
Recognition of this distinction between normal criminal prosecutions
and the habeas petitions of Guantánamo detainees is especially important
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in the context of admissibility of hearsay at such proceedings. Al-Bihani
established that hearsay is “always admissible” in such proceedings, and that
habeas courts must only ask “what probative weight to ascribe to whatever
indicia of reliability it exhibits” (Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879). The court
in Awad clarified the end result of such an inquiry, holding that “hearsay
evidence is admissible in this type of habeas proceeding if the hearsay is reliable”
(Awad, 608 F.3d at 7) (emphasis added). A successful challenge to such
evidence must establish, therefore, not that the evidence simply is hearsay,
but that it is “unreliable hearsay” (Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 422).
The line of cases in the D.C. Circuit also established the varying
standards of review for the pieces comprising the district court’s decision. The
factual findings of the district court are reviewed for “clear error” regardless of
whether they were “based on live testimony or ... documentary evidence”; this
standard applies equally to the “inferences drawn” from such findings (Awad,
608 F.3d at 7). The clear error standard of review is a high bar to overcome,
and the Awad court noted that if the district court’s “account of the evidence”
is merely plausible in “light of the record viewed in its entirety,” the appellate
court is forbidden from ordering reversal (Id.). A “permissible view” of the
evidence can therefore never be clearly erroneous (Id.). Beyond the standards
for review of the factual records, the appellate courts must review a district
court’s “habeas determination de novo, and any challenged evidentiary rulings
for abuse of discretion” (Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 424 (quoting Al-Bihani, 590
F.3d at 870)).
These differing standards are especially important in the review of
whether a detainee was part of a force associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban,
as discussed above. This is a “mixed question of law and fact” (Id.). The
question of “whether a detainee’s alleged conduct ... justifies his detention
under the AUMF is a legal question” that is therefore reviewed de novo; the
question of “whether the government has proven that conduct,” however, is
a “factual question” that is reviewed for clear error under the very difficult
standard delineated above (Id.).
On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13567,
entitled “Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval
Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force” (Exec.
Order No. 13,567 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
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default/files/Executive_Order_on_Periodic_Review.pdf), applicable to “those
detainees held at Guantánamo” on March 7 who had been either “designated
for continued law of war detention” or “referred for prosecution” (Id. § 1(a)).
The Order continues to apply to such detainees even if they are transferred
from Guantánamo to another United States detention facility (Id. § 1(c)). The
Order specifically excludes “those detainees against whom charges [were]
pending” and against whom “a judgment of conviction” had been entered
(Id. § 1(a)). The Order establishes a “process to review on a periodic basis
the executive branch’s continued, discretionary exercise of existing detention
authority in individual cases” (Id. § 1(b)). As such, the scope of the Order is
specifically limited: it “does not create any additional or separate source of
detention authority,” “does not affect the scope of detention authority under
existing law,” and, in relation to Boumediene, does not “affect the jurisdiction
of Federal courts to determine the legality of [Guantánamo detainees’]
detention” or interfere with their “constitutional privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus” (Id.). This Order, however, stands in direct contravention to the
previous command issued by Obama in January, 2009 (Exec. Order 13,492
(2009)), “Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities,” available at http://
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf), which ordered the closure
of Guantánamo’s detention facilities by no later than January, 2010, (Exec.
Order 13,567 at § 3) and also demanded an immediate “review of the status
of each individual currently detained at Guantánamo” (Id. § 4(a)). The 2011
Order’s review procedure sets a baseline standard warranting the continued
detention of a detainee that hinges on whether “it is necessary to protect
against a significant threat to the security of the United States” (Exec. Order
No. 13,567 at § 2). The Periodic Review process outlined by the President
is to be coordinated by the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
Attorney General, and must be consistent with the requirements outlined for
(a) an initial review; (b) a subsequent full review; (c) continuing file reviews;
and (d) a final review of the decisions made by the Periodic Review Boards
(Boards) (Id. § 3(a)-(d)). The Boards consist of one senior official from the
Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, and one
official representing the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Id. § 9(b)).
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The Order requires an initial review for every detainee within one year
of March 7, 2011 (Id. § 3(a)). Prior to the initial review, a detainee must be
provided a written notice of the review, a summary of the facts the Board will
consider in its evaluation, and the reasons outlined by the government for the
detainee’s continued detention (Id. § 3(a)(1)). During these proceedings, the
detainee shall have the assistance of a government-provided representative
or can retain private counsel (Id. § 3(a)(2)); the detainee, with counsel, can
present a statement, introduce any relevant information, answer questions,
and call available witnesses with material information (Id. § 3(a)(3)). The
Secretary of Defense, in opposition to the detainee’s release, shall provide
to both the Board and detainee’s representative “all information ... relevant
to the determination” on whether the detainee meets the baseline standard
described above, which includes “all mitigating information” (Id. § 3(a)
(4)-(5)). The information provided to counsel may, on determination by the
Review Board, be provided in the form of a substitute or summary in order
to “protect national security ... intelligence sources and methods” (Id. § 5).
Following the hearing, the Board shall make a “prompt determination, by
consensus and in writing, as to whether the detainee’s continued detention
is warranted” based on the above standard and this must be provided to the
detainee within thirty days (Id. § 3(a)(7)).
Beyond the initial review, the Order establishes a subsequent “full
review” and hearings by the Board every three years using the same
procedures outlined above (Id. § 3(b)). In the interim between full reviews,
each detainee’s continued detention is subject to a “file review” every six
months, conducted by the Board, consisting of a “review of any relevant new
information” compiled by the Secretary of Defense (Id. § 3(c)). At each file
review, the detainee can make his own submission: if a “significant question”
is raised as to whether the “detainee’s continued detention is warranted,”
the Board will “promptly convene a full review” consistent with the above
procedures (Id.). Finally, a Review Committee conducts a “Board review” if a
Committee member so seeks within thirty days, or the Board cannot reach an
initial consensus (Id. § 3(d)).
The failure of the Board to determine that a detainee meets the baseline
standard requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to use “vigorous efforts”
to “identify a suitable transfer location ... outside of the United States” that is
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“consistent with [U.S.] national security and foreign policy interests” (Id. § 4).
A Committee is then in charge of reviewing, on an annual basis, the “status of
transfer efforts” for those detainees needing transfer after a Periodic Review,
in addition to the transfer efforts for detainees granted a writ of habeas corpus
from a federal court (Id. § 5(1)-(2)). The Order, and transfer process, is to be
implemented in accordance with “laws relating to the transfer, treatment,
and interrogation of individuals detained in an armed conflict,” including the
Convention Against Torture (Id. § 10(b)).
President Obama made a campaign pledge to close Guantánamo by
January 2010, returning as many detainees as advisable to their states.
Through U.S. Attorney General Holder, the administration proposed
trying some detainees in federal court in New York and others in military
commissions at Guantánamo, with the possibility of adapting a Thomson,
Illinois, prison for the detainees. Congress responded by seeking to bar
transfer of detainees to the U.S. for prosecution and resisting funding for the
Illinois prison (with some Democrats insisting on trials and some Republicans
opposed to any imprisonment in the United States). The New York mayor and
others resisted trials in New York City; while the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and others insisted on trials, not commission proceedings.
Complicating matters even more, the attempted airplane bombing by a
Yemeni on Christmas day in 2010 suspended all transfers of Guantánamo
detainees to Yemen.
President Bush transferred 537 detainees. How many reverted to terrorist
activities? As of October 2010, 81 were “confirmed” and 69 “suspected” of
terrorist or insurgent activities of the 598 detainees transferred. President
Obama has transferred 67, including more than a dozen in Europe.
Where to return, or where and how to try the remaining detainees?
Approximately 72 of the 779 detainees remain as of April 2011. According
to a January 22, 2010, Justice (State, Homeland Security, Dept. of Defense,
Justice, CIA, and FBI officials) Task Force Report, of the 110 who might
be released, 80 were Yemeni. Of those, approximately 30 were eligible
for immediate release and 30 others when Yemen is sufficiently stable.
According to the same report, 35 detainees were to be tried in federal court
or commissions. Most problematic, there are approximately 47 to be held
indefinitely due to evaluations suggesting they are too dangerous for release,
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but for whom there is insufficient admissible evidence for a commission
proceeding, according to Guantánamo documents leaked in April of 2011
(The Guantánamo Files).
Experienced military interrogators are among the first to say that torture
is often counterproductive, unproductive in terms of reliable information,
and unnecessary despite all the “ticking time-bomb” scenarios used in its
justification. Much of this is a matter of common sense. How many of us
would confess to virtually anything if subjected to torture on a daily basis?
Many of these detainees are not reticent to assume responsibility for their
crimes, in their fanaticism proud to admit to them. Among many other
military heroes, General Fred Haynes, a young captain with the U.S. Marines
Combat Team 28 at the battle of Iwo Jima, speaks convincingly against the
use of torture, describing how humanitarian treatment of Japanese prisoners
in one of the most harrowing ordeals imaginable led to their cooperation in
providing valuable information to their U.S. captors. What is the cost for
torture of these “high-value” detainees? Obviously, it provided propaganda to
our enemies, prompted problems and often disappointment from our allies,
and tarnished a tradition of democratic and humanitarian ideals dearly paid
for by those who have served so admirably and humanely in our military.
There is also the legal cost. One of the most fundamental tenets of our
constitutional law system and humanitarian law is that statements obtained
by torture are inadmissible for any purpose. No judge, whether in a military
commission or a federal trial, can convict on the basis of evidence obtained
through torture. The bottom line is that the very terrorists who should have
been treated the most cautiously by experienced military interrogators to
satisfy unavoidable evidentiary requirements were not, despite the substantial
likelihood that evidence against them and others could have otherwise been
obtained. As a practical matter, prosecutors, whether before the commissions
or federal court, found themselves in the difficult position of being unable
to rely on admissions that might have been otherwise obtained, and were
required to find new evidence untainted by the coerced admissions.
So justice will hopefully begin for the victims of 9/11, as well as the
victims of the Cole bombing in 2000, in 2011. The proceedings will take
place in the only place they can be held, and in the only form they can be
held, due to Congressional restrictions on any detainee even being brought
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into the U.S. Some commentators, including notably John Yoo, one of the
architects of the prior administration’s torture policy, have said the decision
to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is an “implicit confession” by the Obama
administration that military commissions are the “best balance of security
needs and protections for liberty.” A forced decision is not an implicit
admission any more than a statement obtained through torture is a reliable
admission of guilt. Whether a Guantánamo military commission is the
best option or not, it is for the foreseeable future the only option provided
by Congress. If Khalid Sheikh Mohammed can be convicted by a military
commission, it will be a testament to the dedication of many unrecognized
military investigators and lawyers seeking to undo the damage done from a
policy of torture, with admissible evidence of guilt.
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